On Sunday the 24th of July 1966, the first day of what was named Operation Hobart, the
battalion patrolled east in secrecy f'or about four thousand metres (4 kilometres) from the Task force
perimeter at Nui Dat to an overnight concentration area in the jungle. The next day, a blocking and
sweeping operation would begin against an enemy force, a battalion sized camp of which, had been
discovered by the SAS further to the east, about nine kilometres in all from Nui Dat.
On Monday the 25th of July. the first significant sign of the enemy was discovered when C
Company. commanded on the day by its second-in-command, Captain Peter Harris, came across a large
store of rice and was ordered by battalion headquarters to leave a platoon to ambush it. At 1208 hours
(12.08 pm) the depleted company left the site and continued to advance south-south eastwards
At 1308 hours (1 .08 pm) after patrolling for about five hundred metres, the leading troops
approached a cleared area where the paddy fields made an indent into the jungle. 7 Platoon, saw two VC
watching them from a bamboo clump located about 60 metres out in the cleared area. The platoon
opened fire and two VC were hit but immediately afterwards. on a front of about 125 metres, the tree
line across the cleared indent erupted in a hail of tire directed at 7 Platoon.
Captain Harris ordered his Support Section to move forward and give covering fire to 7
Platoon, about 40 enemy were counted moving about in the thick jungle.
It was obvious that a large force had been contacted. Bugle call were sounding as the enemy
manoeuvred. sending cold shivers down the spines of the startled soldiers of Charlie Company.
Artillery fire was called for from the battalion's direct-support battery. the New Zealand Army's 161
Battery.
During the intense fighting, a machine-gunner. Private W.J. (Bill) Winterford, a national
5erviceman reached to re-cock his machine gun and whilst doing so was hit in the arm by a shard of
shrapnel from the artillery barrage. Despite the massive wound that was to lose him his arm. he
continued to engage the enemy and give vital support to other members of his platoon who were
coming under sustained attack.
7 Platoon now reported another casualty, Sapper Leslie Prowse, an attached engineer from
] st Field Squadron Royal Australian Engineers. He had been badly wounded by enemy small-arms fire.
By now 8 Platoon had come up and C Company was directing a massive torrent of fire into
the enemy positions across the clearing.
Despite this. using bugle calls as signals, the VC attempted to attack 7 Platoon. Every weapon
in the company was now directed at the fleeting forms of the advancing enemy troops. Enemy mortar
fire began landing in the 7 Platoon area and the rest of the company increased the rate of covering fire.
At 1350 hours (1.50 pm), 32 minutes after the fighting began. the enemy broke contact and withdrew
south. Several enemy had been seen to be killed The company became busy with securing a landing
zone for the evacuation by helicopter of the two badly wounded soldiers.
Subsequent analysis of the contact indicates that both the VC and C Company were somewhat
unbalanced at the moment of the encounter. Both retaliated with impressive firepower but neither quite
knew what they had struck. The VC must have been taking moderate casualties from C Company and
the artillery fire, particularly when attempting the move on 7 Platoon. Perhaps their casualties caused
the decision to withdraw, as it was later found that the enemy force comprised the headquarters of
D445 Battalion with its supporting elements.
Despite his impressive force, the enemy's day was not going to improve. Because Colonel
Townsend had resisted the temptation to chopper the battalion into the area, but had instead undertaken
the long approach march in secret. The enemy knew neither that the rest of 6RAR was in the area nor
that his movements were being reported throughout the battalion. Having broken off contact with C
Company, the enemy withdrew south along a well-used bullock cart track adjacent to the river. Across
the river, the jungle ended where it met the paddy fields.
B Company, commanded by Major Noel Ford was 1.300 metres to the south. was ordered to
take up a defensive position to await developments. The company hastily dug shell scrapes in the root
infested area.
At 1355 hours (1.55 pm) two enemy scouts appeared from the north, a short distance to the
front of two sentries of B Company's 6 Platoon, commanded by Second Lieutenant B.D. (Harry)
Short, The sentries fired and hit both enemy soldiers. The VC deployed and brought sustained fire to
bear on 6 Platoon, using small arms, a machine gun. grenade launchers and hand-thrown grenades. 6
platoon returned the fire with everything they had, including artillery support, but the enemy kept up
their own firestorm for a full fifteen minutes. The platoon took only one casualty at this stage, Private
A. T. (Anthony) Purcell shot through the wrist.
Unites States air force support had been requested and F-IOO Super Sabre aircraft arrived soon
after and were directed to begin striking at a nearby enemy battalion size base camp that the SAS had
discovered earlier and also at likely enemy withdrawal routes.
In B Company, after twenty minutes of quiet, it was thought that the enemy had withdrawn.
Major Ford ordered 6 Platoon to clear the battlefield. The section detailed for the task rather
incautiously stood up to do so and the whole platoon again came under withering fire from a large
number of enemy who had crept through the heavy bamboo to a position very close to their perimeter.
Sergeant 'Butch' Brady and Corporal R.W. (Rob} Walker were hit. All B Company's platoons and
company headquarters then came under sustained mortar fire. which searched across the position from
one flank to the other. Several enemy bugles were blowing, one very close in. adding to the tumult of
sound and fury. and giving the Diggers a nasty fright.
4 Platoon, commanded by Second Lieutenant W.L. (Bill) Kingston. was located on the north
west of the company position. and was now probed by enemy patrols and also came under sustained
fire, one soldier being wounded by enemy mortar fire. This enemy activity was possibly an attempt to
either outflank 6 Platoon or just establish the extent of B Company's position. In any case the VC were
driven off.
Not so with 6 Platoon ,which again came under sustained attack by enemy troops, now
advancing in rushes. It was necessary to bring the artillery fire right in on the perimeter to break-up
these attacks and it was difficult to separate its fire from the enemy mortar fire.
Then the action stopped as suddenly as it had started, probably when the enemy commander
finally realised he was once again receiving heavy casualties and was not going to overwhelm 6
platoon. Or maybe it was because the enemy OC had been mortally wounded at that stage. in any case
the VC broke contact and withdrew " to the south-east". 6 Platoon by now had taken ten casualties.
These included two killed in action. Company headquarters had taken three wounded by enemy mortar fire; the NZ artillery forward observation officer, Captain K.P. (Pat) Murphy, his senior radio operator and the CSM WO2 Rex McCall. Despite being wounded the two Kiwis managed to continue to direct the artillery fire. Some of the casualties in 6 Platoon were probably from only one shell of our own artillery that fell inside the perimeter. For not the last time it had been necessary to bring artillery down dangerously
close to our own troops to break-up waves of attackers.
5 Platoon, commanded by Second Lieutenant John O'Halloran, sat through the saga unassaulted, but peppered by shrapnel. The diggers could see the foliage above their heads rapidly thinning out; being shredded by the massive amount of hot bullets whipping through the air. They were kept interested by the sound of enemy mortars, one which became came stuck in a tree above their position, and the need to keep their heads up to look out for the approach of waves of attacking enemy through the thick bamboo.
Twelve enemy mortar bombs exploded within the platoon perimeter during the action and contributed to the general discomfort. Major Ford in his after-action report says of the enemy: The VC force encountered was very quick in reacting and deployed when the contact was made. Their fire and movement were good and the soldiers brave and determined. Their fire power was impressive and virtually every man appeared to have an automatic weapon of some kind. Their 60-mm mortars were accurate and searched the company position thoroughly
But all the drama was not over yet. C Company had evacuated its sick and wounded and now as night began to close in, B Company moved to secure a helicopter landing zone to evacuate its dead and wounded. At 1750 hours (5.50 pm) the "dustoff" (medical evacuation) helicopters began to arrive. The first was the US Army medical evacuation helicopter with its big red crosses, always on standby at task force headquarters, and then three RAAF Iroquois slick ships. During the evacuation, the choppers were fired on by the enemy and one damaged. The company, then withdrew to it's night harbour position and air strikes and artillery fire continued to fire on the likely enemy withdrawal routes. The next morning B Coy returned to clear the battle field. The operation was completed on the 29th of July
Honours and AwardsClick Here
Honours and AwardsClick Here