Frequently Asked Questions: soc.history.war.vietnam
The FAQs on the Australian involvement in Vietnam were written by
Brian Ross.
Australia's involvement in the Vietnam War, the political dimension
This is the second post promised analysing why Australia entered
the Vietnam War. American readers should be warned that because it
looks primarily at the domestic political scene in Australia at the
time, it does as a consequence refer to characters and events which
most of you will not be aware of. However, I have included a short
preface, attempting to identify most of the major players and the
themes which ran behind the scenes in Australian society.
Preface:
There were, during the 1950's and 1960's three main political
parties in Australia. They were:
The Australian Labor Party (ALP). A mildly left-of-centre,
socialist party, the ALP was concieved, like its British and New
Zealand counterparts to represent the rights of the workers against
those of the employers. It held power during the years 1941-1949,
being defeated after a series of disasterous Communist led coal
strikes which had crippled the economy and because of fears within the
electorate that its plan to nationalise the banks in 1949 meant that
it was moving too far to the left.
The Liberal Party. A mildly, right-of-centre, conservative
party, the Liberals (a misnaming if ever there was one IMO), were
created out of the remains of the United Australia Party, which had
dissolved as a consequence of losing government in 1941 as the result
of a no-confidence motion in the then Prime Minister, R.G.Menzies.
Menzies had then been re-elected in 1949 after skilfully making use of
the electorate's fears of Communism. This "kicking the Communist can"
as it became known was an electoral tactic which the Liberals used
time and time again successfully as a means of keeping the ALP in
Opposition.
The Country Party. A party which was and still is basically a
mix of elements of both left and right and designed to represent the
interests of the country dwellers and farmers of Australia. It held
government in coallition with the Liberals during the period under
examination and for a short period (second shortest on record) its
leader, John McEwin was the PM after the accidental death by drowning
of the Liberal PM in 1967.
Background History:
Australia has long suffered from a sense of unease about its
position as the only European settled country in Asia. Australian
society has long (and still does, unfortunately amongst some sections)
harboured a fear of the "yellow hordes" waiting to "descend upon
Australia" and steal it away from the privileged few white
colonialists living here. While this fear could perhaps be best
described as being a form of cultural paranoia (well, considering that
until the end of WWII and the start of Government sponsored migration
the population had stabilised at around the 7 million mark you can
understand why most Australians feared the possible invasion by
potential "hordes").
This fear had resulted in the formulation of one of the most
restrictive immigration policies the world has seen entitled "The
White Australia Policy" which was designed to prevent Asian migration
and only allow in whites which were deemed by the government of the
day as being suitable (thankfully that has been consigned to the
dustbin of history). This fear seemed to have been proven well
founded when the Japanese advanced to within comparative spitting
distance of the continent in 1942.
Because of its large size and small population Australia had long
relied upon what have become known as, and in some circles derided as,
"great and powerful friends" to provide for its defence. First Great
Britian and then America, successive Australian governments have seen
the ability of the country to integrate itself into an alliance system
where defence is collectively shared and Australian defence spending
kept under tight control allowing the civilian population to share
unrivalled prosperity (Australia before WWI had the highest standard
of living per capita in the world). With the collapse of the British
Empire, and perhaps most importantly the loss of the fortress of
Singapore, Australia turned to the new power in the Pacific, America.
A treaty formalising the new relationship between it, Australia and
New Zealand called the ANZUS Pact was concluded in 1951.
However, the ANZUS Pact was designed from an American viewpoint
to first reassure Australian and New Zealand concerns about a possibly
rearmed and resurgent Japan and secondarily to tie America in the
defence of the two former Dominions. From the Australian viewpoint,
on the otherhand, it was designed to tie America first and foremost
into the defence of Australia, despite the pertinant clause only
requiring the three parties to "consult" in case of an attack on the
others rather than necessarily having a clause like in the NATO treaty
where an attack on one party is considered an attack on all parties.
So we have, by 1965, two radically different interpretations of
the treaty which formed the major plank of Australian defence during
the preceeding decade. This was to prove important as will be
explained.
Why Australia became involved in the Vietnam War:
The reasons as to why Australia became involved in the Vietnam
War have been traditionally painted in the colours of "collective
security" and as part of the anti-Communist "crusade" to contain a
world wide communist threat. However, the decision to become involved
was not one take in isolation by the government of the day in
Canberra. Rather it was the culmination of a long period of tension
and unease, not as one might believe, over the idea of communist
expansionism in Asia, but rather because of what was considered the
unsatisfactory relationship which had developed between Canberra and
Washington. The key to that relationship had been Indonesia and its
relations with Australia over first Dutch West New Guinea (now Irian
Jaya) and then Malaysia. Indeed as Greg Pemberton points out,
"Australia's defence and foreign policy during the post war period
cannot be fully understood without reference to Indonesia."1
In particular there was the problem of Dutch West New Guinea and
Australia's relations with Indonesia. The Labor government under
Chifley in the immediate post-war years had looked favourably upon
Indonesia's claim to self-determination, reflecting a deep commitment
to the Atlantic Charter of 1941 and also a desire to perhaps displace
the Dutch as the main influence in the archipelago. Indeed when the
Dutch attempted to use force to reassert their domination of the
islands after the war, the Australian government sided with the new
Republic. This annoyed both Washington and London which desired to
see that the territories to Australia's north should remain in
"friendly" (ie.colonial) hands. This was, according to Pemberton,
"the highpoint of Australian-Indonesian relations in the post-war
world and led Foreign Minister Dr. Subandria" later to describe Evatt
and the Labor government as the 'mid-wife' of the Indonesian
Republic."2
This attitude quickly changed when a new Liberal-Country Party
coalition government took office in 1949. While it shared the same
desire as its predecessor to maintain good relations with the new
Republic, its past history of a vigorous opposition to the perceived
threat of Communism, both at home and now abroad meant that it was
quickly charting a collision course with Indonesia.
The Liberal and Country parties which constituted the government
during this period had created their policy on this matter while in
opposition at the end of the forties. Many of the conservative
politicians who made up these two parties had been suspicious of the
ambitions of the last Labor Government's Minister for External
Affairs, Dr.H.V.Evatt, while the ideological affinity that was shown
between the ALP and new Indonesian republic had aroused alarm. The
refusal of the Communist dominated Waterside Worker's Union to load
Dutch ships, bound for Indonesia, during the new republic's struggle
for independence had been important in creating pro-Dutch sentiments
amongst the coalition's leaders. This apparent collusion between the
Indonesians and the Australian Communists was enough cause for grave
suspicion amongst the soon to be elected opposition leaders, about the
new republic's political alignment.3
Menzies could have perhaps overcome earlier prejudices, had it
not been for Australia's perception of the strategic importance of the
island of New Guinea. With the near run result of 1942 still fresh
in their minds, when the Japanese onslaught had only just been stayed
north of Port Moresby, it was not unusual that the new Liberal
Minister for External Affairs, P.C.Spender would declare that New
Guinea was, "an absolutely essential link in the chain of Australian
defence" and added Australia has, "the duty of ensuring by every means
open to us that in the island areas immediately adjacent to Australia,
in whatever direction they lie, nothing takes place that can in any
way offer a threat to Australia".4
Despite this declaration, it would have been perhaps logical that
the Government would have re-evaluated its perception of the
importance of New Guinea to Australia, particularly in the light of
having just signed the ANZUS agreement in 1951. Article V of which
guarantee. 11 the integrity of both Australia's and New Zealand's
Pacific territories. This would have meant that New Guinea was no
longer essential to Australia as a buffer against a possibly
expansionist Indonesia as Australia's integrity was now
apparently guaranteed.
So for strategic reasons, even if perhaps mistaken, the
Australian government desired a continuing Dutch presence in West New
Guinea. It tried to achieve this by both cooperation with the Dutch
and by lobbying at the United Nations, in an effort to frustrate
Indonesian claims to the island.
However, neither of these policies was pursued with any
consistency. In November 1957, the Governments of Australia and the
Netherlands declared a policy of close cooperation in New Guinea
since,
"The territories of Netherlands New Guinea, and the
Australian Trust Territory of New Guinea and Papua are
geographically and enthologically related... future
development of their respective populations must benefit
from cooperation in policy and administration."5
This policy of cooperation was actually only minimal for
Australian policy makers knew that this principle of joint development
might prove embarrassing unless it was certain that Indonesia would
not be able to realise her claims to any part of New Guinea, either by
force or by a Dutch withdrawal.
Throughout the fifties Australia's support for the Dutch in West
New Guinea had rested upon one main assumption; that both the United
States and Britain were tacitly in favour of a continuing Dutch
presence there. However events were to prove this assumption wrong.
The British Prime Minister, Harold MacMillan, in a joint press
conference with the Australian Prime Minister, Robert Menzies, in
1958, said that Britain was only willing to support Australia's views
only on, "the plain of the UN."6 Similarly American support was
appearing to wane when both the they, and the British, resumed arms
shipments to Indonesia, despite protests from both the Netherlands and
Australia.7
When it was obvious that there was going to be no guarantee of
American support for Australia's stance, the Government attempted to
adopt a less rigid attitude. They invited the Indonesian Foreign
Minister, Dr Subandrio, to Canberra for talks with the Australian
Minister for External Affairs, R.G.Casey. At the end of these talks
a communique was issued that indicated the Australian Government's
willingness to adopt a more passive role if any agreement was reached
between the Netherlands and Indonesia.8
With the issue of this communique the Government came under
attack from many sections of the community, particularly the press.99
In the face of this strong domestic opposition to the idea of
Indonesian possession of West New Guinea, Prime Minister Menzies
concluded that it would be politically disadvantageous, or even
suicidal for him not to continue with the established policy. It
should be remembered that at this time the Government's majority in
the lower house consisted of one seat, and Menzies always remembered
the collapse of his 1941 Government when a no confidence motion was
passed against him.
Pemberton also raises the point that perhaps Menzies's government
never had any real intention of modifying its real stance over the
matter of West New Guinea. He suggests that these, "events were
possibly part of a deliberate attempt to set up a legal smokescreen
which would obscure Australia's true position."10 While stating that
Australia would accept any peaceful settlement, the government could
not or would not, disassociate itself from the Dutch hard line and
appear sympathetic to the Indonesia claim while also appearing unable
to do anything to help them.
However as can be pointed out, this had one unintended
consequence: by adopting a softer line the Australian government might
well have encouraged the Indonesians to press their claims even harder
on the Dutch. In June 1958, the Indonesian Government gave notice
that it was no longer interested in legal means to settle the dispute,
but would rather now concentrate, "on a contest of power" to resolve
the problem. Australia's seeming intractability, despite the "new
face" which Canberra had assumed over the problem after the visit of
Dr.Subandrio to Canberra, was also proving to be a great irritant to
Jakarta, By late 1961 the question of a continuing Dutch presence in
West New Guinea had become a burning national issue.
The proceedings at the United Nations General Assembly session of
1961 left the problem even more confused. The Dutch Government,
sickening of the matter, tried to hand the problem over to the UN,
which refused it. The United States, and most other nations were
obviously unwilling to support any move that would keep the territory
from the possession of Indonesia, for Dr. Sukarno commanded
considerable influence amongst third world
At the same time India had just ended Portugal's colonial
presence in Goa through the use of force. When the impotence of the
UN to take action was shown, the attitudes of Indonesia, the
Netherlands and the United States abruptly changed. The day after
India's invasion of Goa, President Sukarno ordered a general
mobilisation.11 He also sent a letter to President Kennedy warning
that Indonesia would use force if necessary to resolve the matter.
The US Government attempted to head off armed conflict by trying to
get both countries to the conference table. Kennedy pressed the
Dutch to drop their preconditions to negotiations and made his
Government available as a mediator.12
Though the Dutch Government steadfastly refused to drop its
precondition of the principle of self-determination for the natives of
West New Guinea, by the end of 1961 it seemed that the Dutch had
reconciled themselves to the idea that they would have to bow to
Indonesian military and American diplomatic pressures.13
Australia however continued with its hardline policy towards the
problem. With the issue of a stern note to the Indonesian Ambassador
Menzies made a final effort to press Indonesia to a settlement without
resort to force, and Australia moved even further from the reality of
the situation. Sukarno's reply showed that his Government was not
impressed by Australia's declarations.
Sir Garfield Barwick, the new Minister for External Affairs,
quickly realised that a continuation of this policy without backing
from America, would leave Australia open to nothing but ridicule and
enmity from its nearest neighbour. He issued a statement to attempt to
defuse the situation. In it he reversed the earlier strategic
assessment of the importance of West Guinea to Australian interests.
He "saw no evidence whatever of any present threat to Australia or to
any Australian interest."14
While helping in calming the situation with Indonesia to some
extent the statement aroused a considerable storm of protest in some
sections of the community. The Opposition leader, Arthur Calwell,
called it, "...abject appeasement...A betrayal as great as Munich had
been."15
But what had cause this sudden volte face of Government policy?
Hanno Wiesbrod,16 suggests that the Government had received from the
Chiefs of Staff a strategic reassessment of the importance of West New
Guinea, in the light of article V of the ANZUS agreement. The
Military reported that the possession of West New Guinea by the
Indonesians would not be a threat to Australia because,
1) Indonesia's offensive potential was rated as very low.
It was considered to be difficult, if not impossible for
Indonesia to mount and sustain a large scale invasion force.
2) The rugged remoteness of the terrain would also be an
inhibiting factor for direct invasion as well as subversive
activities. (Subversive activities were rated to have only
nuisance value.)
3) In the event of a large scale conflict with a Communist
and/or Communist supported Indonesia the American guarantee
under ANZUS would operate. A repetition of a World War II
experience would be unlikely since the United States had a
preponderance of naval power in the Pacific.17
With the Indonesian threat destroyed by their "expert" advisers
the only remaining question facing the Government was whether or not
it was still in Australia's interest to continue with its opposition
to Indonesia's claim.
As American support was lacking, Australia would have stood
alone. Sir Garfield Barwick's argument against the standing hard
line policy, still favoured by his fellow cabinet members, was that
such a move would have been against the best interests of Australia,
and would only have prolonged the dispute. Since the Australian half
of New Guinea was guaranteed under ANZUS, it appeared dangerous and
short sighted to incur the further enmity of Indonesia.
With India having set the example in Goa it was only a matter of
time before Indonesia would be in conflict with the Dutch forces
present in Dutch West New Guinea. The idea of Australia becoming
involved in such a conflict would have been ludicrous, Australia
lacked both the manpower under arms and the weapons to prosecute a
conflict with Indonesia. Australia would also have become isolated in
what would have appeared to be an anti-colonialist struggle. It would
have embarrassed and alienated the US and would have weakened any
claim Australia might have had on American assistance if eastern New
Guinea had been attacked. While finally for the cabinet members who
felt that Australia would have been letting down the Dutch, Barwick
pointed out that the Dutch had already declared their willingness to
give up their administration of the territory, at the session of the
UN assembly the previous year.
So it was that Australia quickly bowed out as a major participant
in the dispute. It did however still remain involved with attempts
to get the Indonesians and the Dutch to negotiate over the matter.
After several armed clashes, usually with the Indonesians coming off
second best, an agreement was reached on 15 August 1962 with the
result that the UN took over administration for a short period. This
quickly ended and Indonesia assumed control of the western half of the
island.
Australia finally gave into the Indonesians on the matter by
justifying it to itself that it was better that the Indonesians gained
the island, than the possibility of an armed conflict which would,
"threaten world peace and could well bring disaster to South-East Asia
by its encouragement of Communist activity and intervention."18 There
was also the fear that if the Indonesian government came under the
pressure of promoting a war that the influence of the PKI (Communist
Party of Indonesia) might become more powerful.
The result of this mishandling of the West New Guinea affair was
most certainly a failure of Australian foreign policy for the
Liberal-Country Party Government of the period. The Government had
not attempted to point out the realities of the situation to the
people, with the result that the Casey-Subandrio communique issued in
1959, which would have modified Australian policy in line with the
realities of the situation, was not well received by either the public
or the Opposition. This forced the Government to continue with its
unrealistic policies until forced to either back them with some form
of force or change them. It was only with the appointment of a new
Minister for External Affairs, that Menzies was wakened to the
dangerous position that his policies had placed the Government in.
Being unable to back this hardline policy with either Australian or
perhaps more importantly, American muscle, meant that Australia became
open to ridicule, particularly when Indonesia resorted to force.
Indeed Renouf suggests that the failure of Australia's policy
towards West New Guinea had fateful consequences for her Indonesian
relations. "When on 17 August 1963 Sukarno acclaimed his 'Year of
Triumph', he knew that his victims included Australia."19 He had
achieved his goal by doing whatever he liked in the teeth of
Australia's opposition. Australia, Indonesia concluded, was no mat ch
for them and, in case of trouble between the two countries, Indonesia
did not have to be unduly preoccupied with the reactions of
Australia's protector, the United States.
This then forced the Government to back down and most certainly
damaged our standing in Indonesian eyes and contributed to the
formulation of a policy of "confrontation" by Dr. Sukarno as a method
by which Indonesian interests could be furthered.
As we have seen Australia was unable to back its rhetoric against
Indonesian expansion in New Guinea with force. One of the reasons
why she was unable to do so was because the small Australian Army,
which surely numbered only four Battalions of infantry plus some
supporting units was already committed to other overseas countries, as
well as the defence of the Australian mainland. In April 1955
Menzies had committed one of these Battalions to the defence of
Malaya, where it was stationed as part of the Strategic Commonwealth
Reserve.
After the success of Indonesia's policies in the matter of West
New Guinea, Dr. Sukarno decided to apply them against the newly
formed state of Malaysia, which consisted of Malaya, Sarawak, North
Borneo, Singapore and initially Brunei. Indonesia had at first wished
Malaysia all success but by the end of 1962 Jakarta had changed its
tune. While it admitted it had no territorial claim upon Malaysia,
Subandrio said, Indonesia could not remain indifferent to its
formation because the Federation would have a common boundary with
Indonesia. Just afterwards Indonesia supported a revolt in Brunei,
which while not connected with the proposal for the Sultanate to join
the new federation, was used as a causus belli for the need for
confrontation on the behalf of the people of North Borneo by Jakarta.
On 20 January 1963 Subandrio announced "confrontation" with
Malaysia, because Malay was not fully independent but rather
"neo-colonialist". Other Indonesian leaders explained that Malaysia
did not really represent the wishes of the people of North Borneo, or
Sabah as it is now known, and also Sarawak.20
At first only with words , then anti-British and anti-Malaysian
demonstrations and riots, it quickly became a small scale war with the
beginning of the infiltration by Indonesian troops across the borders
of North Borneo. Britain reacted by ordering its troops into North
Borneo to defend it against Indonesian infiltrators. Australia was
quick to follow, desiring to ensure that Britain remained tied into
guaranteeing the stability of the region.21 This left only two
Battalions for the defence of mainland Australia and its widespread
territories.
In November 1963, Menzies held a snap election with defence as
the major issue. The items under discussion were the joint
Communications base at North West Cape, the Fiji procurement decision
and the Labor party's proposal of a Nuclear free Southern Hemisphere.
Menzies successfully argued that Labor's policy on all three
represented a danger to Australia's security. After winning an extra
seven seats in Parliament the Government believed that the public
supported a policy on Forward Defence and by 1965 Australian troops
were fighting the Indonesian insurgents in Sabah and Sarawak.
--- This article is continued in Australian Involvement (3/3) ---
_______________________________
- -Brian Ross------------------------------------------------------
"For I will work the work in your days which ye will
not believe, though it be told to you"
------------------------------------------Habakkuk, 7th Century BC-
=================================================================
Copyright (c) 1995 Brian Ross. Non-commercial distribution for
educational purposes permitted if document is unaltered. Any
commercial use, or storage in any commercial BBS is strictly
prohibited without written consent.
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