The FAQs on the Australian involvement in Vietnam were written by
Brian Ross.
--- This is the continuation of the article in soc.history.war.vietnam
FAQ: Australian Involvement (2/3) ---
The Labor party, once more consigned to the opposition benches in
Parliament, pointed out that Australia was not bound in any way to
help Malaysia, Australia being only committed to the defence of Malaya
under the ANZAM agreement. They would have preferred a formal treaty
between the two states as to what sort of commitment that Australia
was to make to Malaysian defence. This was however defeated in
parliament along party lines when it went to the vote.
Although the confrontation consisted of counterinsurgency
operations in North Borneo, the Government was worried about a direct
attack by Indonesia against Australian territory, in particular New
Guinea. When in may 1964 Sukarno called upon "21 million volunteers"
to crush Malaysia, and his Government told Australia not to interfere
in what was basically an Asian problem, warning that if Australia did
become involved then the responsibility would be Australia's alone.22
After this was announced there followed a discussion on 21 April
1964 in Parliament, as to whether an attack by Indonesians on
Australian troops in Borneo would activate the terms of the ANZUS
agreement, leading to the involvement of America. After criticism
from the opposition leader Arthur Calwell, who' said that, "America
does not believe that its commitment does include the protection of
Australia troops already in Malaya".23
The Prime Minister, Robert Menzies replied that while the letter
of ANZUS does not cover Australia troops stationed abroad, the intent
did. He suggested that,
"The United States of America did not even withdraw its
support for Malaysia. It has recognised Malaysia, and it
wants Malaysia to be maintained... [but] That when it came
to the immediate defence of Malaysia this was perhaps
primarily a Commonwealth responsibility."24
Despite the brave words the government was worried. It feared the
possibility of the confrontation escalating and that as its troops
were already in contact with the Indonesians in North Borneo, that the
United States would not come to its aid "25
With defence becoming more of important in the thinking of the
Government, selective compulsory conscription was introduced before
Parliament on 10 November 1964.26 This was to increase the Army to an
effective strength of 37,000. The reason being given was a lack of
sufficient volunteers, due to a period of full employment and economic
expansion in the civil sector. This build up of the Army was required
for, Menzies said,
our deteriorating strategic: situation. We expect a
continuing requirement to make our forces available for cold
war and counterinsurgency tasks. We must have forces ready
as an immediate contribution should hostilities occur.27
The small Australia Army was over-extended by its commitments
both in Malaya and Borneo and the result was that only two Battalions
to defend Australia. The Army was also committed to providing
"advisers" as part of an aid package to the Government of South
Vietnam in its war against Communist insurgents and this was
stretching its limited resources to the maximum. Obviously more
manpower was required if a credible defence was to be mounted against
the threat of Indonesian aggression and the only way that could be
achieved was through conscription.
Then it was announced that Australian combat troops in the form
of one infantry Battalion, with supporting elements, would be
committed to the war in South Vietnam, on 29 April 1965. The Govt.
was criticised by the Opposition as well as by a strong vocal
middle-class minority which could not be dismissed as Communist or
pro- Communist in their views.
This vocal minority was made up of numerous dignitaries,
including Bishops of various denominations, who were extremely
critical of the policies of the rapidly changing South Vietnamese
Governments. They believed that the Australian Government should
seek a negotiated settlement of the conflict, rather than sending more
military aid.28
As a result of this decision Australian conscripts would, for the
first time serve outside Australia or its territories and north of the
Equator. This had not even occurred in World War II, and it
particularly incensed the Opposition leader who held to the ALP's
longstanding opposition to conscription for service not in the direct
defence of Australia.29
This initial commitment of an Infantry Battalion quickly grew to
become a Task Force (or Brigade ) of three or four Battalions with
supporting units of Armour, Engineers, Artillery and Logistic support,
as well as RAAF units flying Canberra's and helicopters and also naval
units. The tasks of these units quickly changed, from guarding and
defensive ones to offensive operations against the Vietnamese
Communists. At its height the Australian commitment to Vietnam
reached 8,000 men in 1968-69.
Australia's involvement in Vietnam was prompted by three main
factors. Perhaps most important of these was a very poor perception
by the Government of world affairs at that time. Throughout the late
fifties and sixties Australian diplomatic circles were firmly
convinced of a subversive "Communist Threat" outside Australia. This
threat, initially directed by Moscow, and later by Beijing, dominated
Australian diplomatic thought for approximately fifteen years.
It had though, roots which went much further back than that. As
Frank Cain mentions,30 the members of the coalition government gained
anti-Communist convictions well before the second world war. He
suggests that the "the road to Vietnam was not only paved with
anti-radical and anti-communist rhetoric and actions but that the
non-Labor forces came to be prisoners of such rhetoric."31
As a consequences of their repeated successes in federal
elections, they were convinced of the appropriateness of these
policies. In fact when they failed to "kick the Communist can" as
they did in 1961, the coalition nearly lost office. As a consequence
the anti- Communist policy of the government under Menzies became
electorally self-rewarding and they sought to use it where ever
possible. This does not deny that they were not totally convinced
for the best of reasons but that they also managed to convince the
electorate that Communism must be opposed where ever possible
As Cain suggests, when Menzies made his statement suggesting that
"the takeover of South Vietnam would be a direct military threat to
Australia,"32 the anti-Communist convictions developed over the
previous five years were now convincing them to intervene and this
action led Australia into the "quagmire of the Vietnamese civil
war."33
Even after the departure of Menzies in 1965, the ideological
crusade to which the Coalition was committed carried it to greater
electoral victories. In the 1966 election Harold Holt's government
was returned by an even greater majority by an electorate who believed
in the necessity to remain in Vietnam.
However as the middle-class became more convinced about the
dangers of their sons being conscripted to fight overseas in Vietnam,
they switched their vote to the Labour Party in response. It was
ironic that the coalition by using anti-Communist rhetoric to maintain
electoral support now lost office by not taking note of it in the
election which led to their defeat in 1972.
The coalition government's doubts about Indonesia's political
alignment had been reinforced over the years by the acceptance of
large quantities of military and civil aid by Jarkata from initially
Moscow, and then later Beijing. While in retrospect it is obvious that
Sukarno was playing the East off against the West in an effort to gain
what he wanted, it raised fears in Canberra that Sukarno was
increasingly coming under the control of the local Communist members
of his government. This was further reinforced when Sukarno
threatened to nationalise the three major oil companies operating in
Indonesia (Shell, Caltex and Stanvac) which represented over $US500
million in investment.34 This fear of a Indonesia becoming a Communist
country on Australia's doorstep further reinforced the already rigid
anti-communist stance of the coalition's leaders.35
This perception of an aggressive Communist threat in Asia
prompted Australian foreign Policy planners to support American
policies in Asia almost completely blind to the realities of the
situation facing them. The war in Vietnam was not perceived as a
local rebellion or civil war, caused by discontent, or even as a war
of "national liberation" from the last vestiges of colonial rule as it
perhaps should have been. Instead, it was perceived by the then
Minister for External Affairs, Paul Hasluck', as he related in his
policy speech on 23 March 1965, as a conflict where, "the application
of the methods of and doctrines of Communist Guerrilla warfare first
evolved in China and then successfully in North Vietnam."36 In his
judgement the South Vietnamese were not dealing simply with a
situation of local unrest, but with a "large scale campaign of
assassination and terrorism", the direction of which was coming from
"outside".37
This "outside" direction was perceived most definitely as from
Beijing. Gregory Clark suggests that this perception of Chinese
aggression was carried to the point of "Sinophobia".38 He relates the
story of how Hasluck visited Moscow in October 1964. He was seeking
to enlist Soviet aid in preventing the success of this perceived
Chinese aggression in Vietnam. Needless to say the Soviets turned
the discussion to things of more interest and use to them.39
This fear of Communist aggression was not, only confined to the
Ministry of External Affairs. The Prime Minister, Sir Robert
Menzies, said in his policy speech on 29April 1965 that,
the takeover of South Vietnam would be a direct military
threat to Australia and all the countries of South and
South-East Asia. It must be seen as a part of a thrust by
Communist China between the Indian and Pacific Oceans.40
The fear of this Communist aggression was founded upon what was
referred to as the "Domino Theory" by its exponents. Unless this
aggressive action by China was stopped in Vietnam, ran the theory,
then after Vietnam had fallen, the surrounding countries would follow,
just like a row of Dominoes. These countries, which tended to be
neutral in their outlook, favouring neither east or west, might become
embroiled in another war like Vietnam, or they might defect to the
Communist line. It was feared that this "domino" action would
eventually lead to Australia's shores and then the policy of forward
defence would mean Darwin instead of Vietnam.
While it was in confrontation with Indonesia the government had
the added fear that, as Renouf suggests, "Indonesian success with
confrontation could lead to a reverse Domino Theory - from south to
north - with Singapore, a strategically placed island, being an early
victim,"41 and with Australia being perhaps the next target.
Perhaps more significant than this as to why Australia became
involved in the Vietnam War, was the Government's policy of relying on
"great and powerful friends" for Australia's defence. The Government
was afraid that if the problems with Indonesia came to armed conflict
then Australia would be abandoned by America and Britain. The
response of its two major allies, Great Britain and the United States,
to the problems of West New Guinea and to a lesser extent Borneo, had
convinced the government that they did not share Australia's deep
concern about Indonesia. The United States was unwilling to support
Australia's stand with anything more substantial than words.
Both Britain and the United States had seen it against their
interests to provoke Indonesia, who commanded considerable power
amongst other third world countries and because of the large amounts
of investment both countries had tied up there. They feared the
danger of Sukarno nationalising their interests without
compensation.42
In addition when Australia had asked the United States for , an
unequivocal commitment under the ANZUS treaty, that it was willing to
guarantee Australia's defence in case things with Indonesia blew up
first over Dutch West New Guinea and then later in Borneo. While
Pemberton suggests that in Washington's mind it was fully committed to
Australia, in Canberra the lack of a public sign or declaration to
that effect weighed heavily on Menzies's mind.43
So it was that Australia was seeking a method by which America
could be "locked into" the defence of both Asia and in particular
Australia, against this feared Communist Aggression. The opportunity
presented itself when America proposed that Australia provide more
advisers and some air and naval aid to Vietnam.44 Australia however
seized upon the chance to offer troops, particularly with the
expansion of the Army to meet "a continuing requirement for cold war
and counter- insurgency tasks".45 While William Bundy, the Assistant
Secretary of State for SE Asia, noted the offer of troops, he was more
hopeful of receiving advisers instead. As America at this time was not
willing to commit her own troops to Vietnam.
As Sexton suggests, this would seem to indicate that the
Australians believed the Americans were not taking a tough enough
line. They had allowed political events, both at home and abroad to
influence their actions. The Australians believed that the Americans
needed their resolve stiffened.46
So it was that Australia offered the use of ground troops on 18
December 1964. Although the announcement that this offer had been
received and accepted by both the Americans and the Parliament until
29 April 1965. Although, as Sexton points out, the request that
Menzies referred to in Parliament was not received by the Australian
Government's representatives in Saigon until that very day had to be
almost forced out of the South Vietnamese government.47
Talks on the matter had taken place well before this date, on 22
April, between the Australian and the Americans. This announcement
came before an American decision to commit ground troops had occurred.
So it was that at Australian insistence, Australian troops were
committed to take part in the Vietnam War not, as was always stated,
on the basis of an American request.48
So it can be seen from these short accounts that Indonesia's
policy of Confrontation over West New Guinea and Malaysia was a major
contributing factor in the Australian Government wishing to become
involved in a war far from Australian shores. Other factors that
contributed to this wish to become involved in an Asian war were the
fear of the Domino theory, the seeming lack of American commitment to
the defence of Asian and Australia in particular, and the fear of a
perceived threat of Communist
As both Sexton, and Cooksey, point out, Australia was not happy
with the United States' performance over the West New Guinea and
Borneo affairs, so in an effort to build up a "credit of goodwill"
with America that could be drawn upon in time of need it would seem
that Australia decided to enter the Vietnam war.49 There is an old
American political adage that says "not what you have done for me, but
what have you done for me lately"? So Australia became involved to
show the Americans that if we were willing to help them, they would
then perhaps be willing to help us if it ever came to the point of war
with Indonesia.
- -Brian Ross------------------------------------------------------
"For I will work the work in your days which ye will
not believe, though it be told to you"
------------------------------------------Habakkuk, 7th Century BC-
----------------------------------------
ENDNOTES
1 p.70, Pemberton, G., All the Way, Australia's Road to
Vietnam, Allen E; Unwin, Sydney, 1987.
2 p.71, Pemberton, G., All the War, Australia's road to
Vietnam.
3 p.24, Wiesbrod, H., 'Sir Garfield Barwick and Dutch New
Guinea, Australian Quarterly, June 1967.
4 p.628, 'Policy Speech on External Affairs', Commonwealth
Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 9 March
1950.
5 p.881-2, Current Notes, Vo1.28, November 1957.
6 quoted p.26, Wiesbrod, H., 'Sir Garfield Barwick and Dutch
New Guinea'.
7 pp.76-9, Pemberton, G., All the Way.
8 pp.80-1, Ibid.
9 p.29, ibid.
10 p.80, ibid.
11 P.99, Pemberton, G., All the Way.
12 p.428, Renouf, A., The Frightened Country, Macmillan,
Melbourne, 1979.
13 idem.
14 p.889, 'Ministerial Statement on West New Guinea, ' ,
Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of
Representatives, 15 March 1962.
15 pp.1151-1161, 'Debate on International Affairs' ,
Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of
Representatives, 21 April 1962.
16 Wiesbrod, H., 'Sir Garfield Barwick and Dutch New Guinea,
Australian Quarterly, June 1967.
17 p.30, Ibid.
18 p.21, Current Notes, Vo1.33, No. 3, 1962.
19 p.431, Renouf A., The Frightened Country.
20 pp.431-2, Renouf, A., The Frightened Country.
21 p.436, ibid.
22 p.157, Andrews, E. M., A History of Australia's Foreign
Policy: from dependence to i n dependence , Longman Cheshire
, Melbourne, 1979.
23 p.1279, 'Debate on International Affairs', Commonwealth
Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 21 April
1964.
24 p.2718 `Defence Review Debate' , Commonwealth
Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 10 November
1964.
25 pp.174-5, Pemberton, G., All the Way.
26 p.2718 `Defence Review Debate' , Commonwealth
Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 10 November
1964.
27 p.2718, 'Defence Review Debate' , Commonwealth
Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 10 November
1964.
28 p.113, Watt, A., Vietnam, An Australian Analysis, F. W.
Cheshire, Melbourne, 1983.
29 p.114, Watt, A., Vietnam, An Australian Analysis.
30 Cain, F.,`Australia's road to Vietnam - Non-Labour and
Anti-Communism 1920-1966', original manuscript supplied by
the author
31.p.1, ibid.
32 pp.1060, `Vietnam - Ministerial Statement', Commonwealth
Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 29 April
1965.
33 p.161 Cain F., `Australia's road to Vietnam - Non-Labour
and Anti-Communism 1920-1966'.
34 p.178, Pemberton, G., All the Way.
35 pp.436-7, Renouf, A., The Frightened Country.
36 p.2381 'Debate on International Affairs', Commonwealth
Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 23 March
1965.
37 ibid.
38 pp.19-20, Clarke, G., 'Vietnam, China and the Foreign
Affairs Debate in Australia, a personal account', in King,
P., (Ed. ), Australia's Vietnam, Allen g Unwin, Sydney,
1983.
39 ibid.
40 pp.1060-1, "Vietnam - Ministerial Statement', Commonwealth
Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 29 April
1965.
41 p.436, Renouf, A., The Frightened Country.
42 p.99, Pemberton, G., All the Way.
43 p.188, Pemberton, G., All the Way.
44 p.61, Sexton, M., War for the Asking, Australia's Vietnam
Secrets, Penguin Books, Ringwood, 1981.
45 p.2718, `Defence Review Debate' , Commonwealth
Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 10 November
1964.
46 p.69, Sexton, M., War for the Asking.
47 pp.140-145r Sexton M., War for the asking.
48 pp.165-171, Sexton, M., War for the Asking
49 p.47, Cooksey, R., 'Assumptions of Australia's Vietnam
Policy', World Review, October 1966.
----------------------------------------
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Primary Sources:
Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of
Representatives.
Current Notes, Vo1.28, November 1957
Secondary Sources:
Andrews, E.M., A History of Australia's Foreign Policy: from
dependence to i n dependence , Longman Cheshire , Melbourne,
1979.
Cain, F.,`Australia's road to Vietnam - Non-Labour and Anti-
Communism 1920-1966', original manuscript supplied by the
author
Clarke, G., 'Vietnam, China and the Foreign Affairs Debate
in Australia, a personal account', in King, P., (Ed.),
Australia's Vietnam, Allen g Unwin, Sydney, 1983.
Cooksey, R., 'Assumptions of Australia's Vietnam Policy',
World Review, October 1966.
Renouf, A., The Frightened Country, Macmillan, Melbourne,
1979.
Pemberton, G., All the Way, Australia's Road to Vietnam,
Allen E; Unwin, Sydney, 1987.
Sexton, M., War for the Asking, Australia's Vietnam Secrets,
Penguin Books, Ringwood, 1981.
Watt, A., Vietnam, An Australian Analysis, F. W. Cheshire,
Melbourne, 1983.
Wiesbrod, H., 'Sir Garfield Barwick and Dutch New Guinea,
Australian Quarterly, June 1967.
_______________________________
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Copyright (c) 1995 Brian Ross. Non-commercial distribution for
educational purposes permitted if document is unaltered. Any
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