On one extreme, the "facts" cherished by the majority are examined, found to be in error, and an attempt is made to rectify those errors. On the other extreme, the "facts" cherished by the majority are, in fact, accurate, and an attempt is made to falsify the records. Most attempts at revising history probably fall somewhere between these two extremes, with facts missing or unclear, experts in dispute, motives and decision processes misunderstood and so on.
Whichever way it happens, somewhere along the path, someone's long-held beliefs are going to be overturned, and nobody wants to be shown they've been wrong. Those guided by intellect and logic may reconsider the proposed revision, examine the new evidence, re-examine the old evidence, and decide whether to accept or reject the revision on the basis of their evaluation. Most, unfortunately, guided by ego, vested interests, or for whatever other reason, will reject the attack on their current beliefs regardless of the merit of the attack, and will cling to their previous beliefs regardless of their accuracy.
Mostly, "history" is written by the victor. Those who know better - those of the "silent majority" - either know the truth so don't believe it really matters, or don't care enough to be the voice of discord, jarring the status quo and drawing attention to themselves by challenging the perceived authority on the matter at hand.
Such a case is the Battle Of Long Tan, fought by 105 Australian and 3 New Zealand soldiers, well supported by ANZAC and US Artillery and a couple of RAAF helicopters, one monsoon-drenched afternoon in August, 1966, in South Vietnam.
Those who were there on the day, those in support, those who had a hand in the events or their aftermath, their families and friends, even the extended armed forces at large all "knew" what happened. We all "knew" that everyone else "knew", so there wasn't any need or desire to write it all down in detail. After all, how could anyone NOT "know"? - it was all just common and accepted knowledge. The facts were simply so obvious. How could it ever be that a lie could be substituted and accepted by others who weren't there?
How could anyone take seriously the VC claims which we so lightly laughed off? Their claim that they'd ambushed us and enjoyed a major victory; how they'd had very few casualties and killed a whole Australian Battalion. We laughed it off because it was so ridiculous. We looked around the battlefield as we buried some 250 VC bodies and laughed at their claims of 30 casualties. We laughed with the rest of the "wiped out" Battalion for the rest of the Tour of Duty. We laughed at their claims of success as we built up and further developed the Task Force base right in the middle of their "home" territory, and which they never thereafter challenged or attempted to attack. We laughed at their claims of success when ANZAC forces searched the Province for them for another several years, and found them only when they tried to target the civilian population or attack some remote and obscure ARVN outpost.
From 1966 to 1972, we all "knew" what had happened. Then the Australians left Vietnam. The "war" was over. The VC (well, the NVA, actually!) were the "victors". It was time they wrote their "history". It was written in the late 70's and the early 80's.
It was shortly after this (in the mid 80's) that two Australian academics (supposedly independently) took the VC view and determined to produce their own versions of the Battle.
Research on a video production prompted the writing of a book on the same subject and, sure enough, a video "documentary" and a book were produced in 1986, and both took the VC view of the Battle! Both stressed the alleged "ambush" nature of the event; both presented substantially the same sources and references; and both omitted many of the sources and references which could have been used to prove their "ambush" assessments inaccurate. Unfortunately for them, both included enough of the accurate information that their own products (the video and the book) could be used to disprove their own cases!
And this is precisely what has been achieved in a 3-hour presentation made to the Australian War Memorial on Nov 1st, 1996.
It was common knowledge after August 1966 that the VC had been foiled in their plans to mount a Regimental-sized assault on the Australian Task Force base at Nui Dat. Their plans had been foiled by their accidental meeting with D Company, 6 Battalion as they (the VC) were approaching the Task Force base on the afternoon before the planned assault.
That this meeting was accidental has been questioned, but not from an "ambush" perspective - many believe that the Task Force Commander was (or at least should have been) aware of the general VC plans and therefore be expecting a large VC troop movement towards the base sometime in the near future.
Whatever the background, the fact is that the Company patrolling away from the base met at least a large part of the VC force moving towards the base. The meeting was unexpected by either side; the VC having thought they'd set effective diversions to ensure they had clear access to their assault start line, and the Australian Company patrolling with orders to search out a VC Mortar Team of less than Platoon strength and following tracks now 36 hours old.
All the evidence presented to the War Memorial came from sources already published - no new evidence was presented. Much of the strongest argument came from the video and book previously mentioned, but other books on the subject were referred to, including the War Memorial's own Official History publication.
The findings were, basically, that the VC had a need to attack the base, they had the strength to do so, their actions and dispositions before and during the Battle indicate they were prepared for a different kind of engagement, and the aftermath supports the assumption that they'd been critically defeated on the day. The only thing missing from the whole argument is the actual Assault Plan, and this will never be released by the VC.
Why? Because the VC propaganda machine was forced to twist the facts to suit the events:So, without the real VC / NVA Plan, we will make do with what is likely to turn out to be a reasonable replica (if ever the real one comes to light!). What follows is my best attempt at producing the sort of Plan that the VC Commanders would have been working to in late July or even early August 1966, in planning their assault on the Australian Base.
(This hill complex was situated astride the junction of three Province borders, at the North East corner of Phuoc Tuy Province. It was well developed, heavily dug-in, tunnelled and fortified, and had been an NVA HQ and logistics base, training area and hospital zone for many years.)
Following the arrival of Australian troops in Phuoc Tuy Province, NVA High Command has given the 5th Division the honour of eliminating them from the Puppet Government's Order Of Battle.
We must strike them before they have established themselves and are well defended, so time is critical. However, despite the rush to Plan, we will observe ALL the Principles of the Approach and Assault as dictated by our Revolutionary Masters.
The following Outline Plan has been developed from information collected by our agents, recce units and civilian cadres in the two months since the Australian forces arrived at Nui Dat.
Since the arrival of the Australian Force and the establishment of their camp at Nui Dat in May, their presence has disrupted our lines of supply and our influence in the hamlet of Hoa Long. It is essential that we do not lose the initiative and thrust of our cause. This will happen if they are permitted to remain there.
We have suffered a number of casualties from the Yankee attacks on our homes at Long Tan and Long Phouc in the preparation for the Australian arrival. The comrades of D445 have lost their homes and the daily support from families and friends.
In the past few weeks the Australians with their patrols and ambushes have inflicted more and more death on our patrols and limited the movement of our forces around the province and our use of well known communication tracks.
The Commander of D445, is noticing the lowering of moral and purpose amongst his younger, less dedicated soldiers with the Australian's arrival. We will stop this decline of control and win the important political war.
We will attack the Australian's in their Base.
They are new to our country and have not had sufficient time to establish defences. Our intelligence groups report that the weakest points of the base perimeter is near the hamlet of Hoa Long and just north and west of Nui Dat Hill.
The monsoon is our friend, the European soldiers do not like getting wet and hide in their little tents. The monsoon will cover our approach to the base once we are within artillery range, cover the sounds of our approach to the wire at H-Hour, and will impede any efforts by the Yankees to follow us after we annihilate the Australian base and its defenders.
There is no moon in the third week of August, so the dark will assist us. The attack will take place between the 16th and 21st of August. We now have three weeks to complete the plan in detail. The general attack plan is as follows:
The map shows the general positions of the enemy units in their base area.
You are required to take particular notice the area occupied by the field guns, those quick firing 105 mm howitzers. I will be go into more detail of those units later. There are eighteen of these guns in total. Our agents report that there is little wire defences and no minefields. Sentries and strong points with machine guns are abandoned when a fire mission is in progress. I have not included the tanks, the 155mm mobile guns of the American's because they are positioned on the West of Route 2, the North/South road through the base.
The Yankee 155mm self propelled tank guns, 6 in all, and the armoured personal carriers, about 30 counted when they come from the South about 2 months ago, are concentrated on the South West and West perimeter of the base.
These two groups will be the greatest threat to our success. All must be destroyed by our anti tank guns and explosives. We have sufficient anti-tank guns in the Division to accomplish the task. Defences of these units, like the gun units, is very poor.
The Infantry units are very thin on the ground. One battalion is always away on an operation, while the second is at the base. Our observation groups believe that when an Infantry unit is away the other occupies their ground positions. This means that there's about 3000 metres of front to protect with 4 companies of about 100 men each. This works out to only 1 soldier per more than 10 metres of front!
We observe very little digging works, and almost no wiring - certainly not enough to delay a determined assault.
So you see, the whole camp is weak.
The Australian patrols have been under continual observation. Our agents will increase their observations and report on what they do. Reports will be given daily on the patrols and ambush sites from now on. It is anticipated that these reports will allow us to plan our movement to avoid areas they may frequently patrol or occupy.
In our attack planning we will have to prepare decoy tracks etc so that at the time of the attack the infantry will not be a serious threat to our attacking force. We also need to plan a diversion to draw any "spare" troops from the base, leaving them with minimum defenders.
The report on other units in the Australian camp is sketchy. We know that there is a Special Forces group, Engineers and other specialist non combat groupings. About 200 to 250 in the area behind the guns on the Southern perimeter. The headquarters of the Australians is located in that area.
Outside ground forces able to assist and reinforce the Australians are 173rd Airborne Brigade, not expected to be a threat during the attack but will be from daylight on the morning after.
The newly arrived Yankee Cavalry only twenty kilometres to the North on Route 2 will be a threat during and immediately after the attack They can move by night to assist and reinforce the Australians. To counter this, one of our Regts will be tasked to ambush Route 2 North of the Binh Ba area. They will be assisted by the local fighters.
275 Regiment (of 3 Battalions) with D445 and D440 Battalions and the attached NVA Battalion (making 6 Battalions plus Supporting Units)will make a night assault on the Australian Base. The date is to be fixed but for planning purposes it will take place no sooner than the 16th of August and not after the 21st of August. Plan on the night 18/19th August.
Two days before the assault night, our Mortar and RR Units will bombard the Australian base HQ area. This action will be so provocative and intolerable to them that they will be forced to send out a reaction force. We will leave signs that the Mortar Group is about Platoon strength to ensure they send out a whole Company. We will leave clear trails out to the North so they're clear of us as we approach from the East. Not only will this reduce the defenders by about 20% for our assault; but they will be in our path as we withdraw after annihilating their base and, without support from their guns, they'll be easy prey for our victorious troops.
H-Hour will be midnight on the night designated.
At H-Hour minus 30 mins a diversion attack will be mounted by a battalion from 274 Regiment, supported by our Anti Aircraft Machine Gun Battery (AA MG Bty). This attack will take place on the West flank of the Northern Infantry unit, with our AA fire being directed onto Nui Dat itself and onto the armoured cars.
The main attack will be a multi-phased attack from the South. At H-Hour we will attack through the guns which will at that time be facing North in support of the troops facing the diversion attack.
The Forming Up Place and the Start Line will be positioned between the Southern units of Artillery and the hamlet of Hoa Long. Movement will be through the deserted village of Long Phuoc, which most of you know well.
Timings and coordination of attacking forces is crucial. Objectives for attacking groups must be achieved on time to maintain the momentum of the attack and the completion of the operation.
The task of the Planning sessions is to confirm the exact placements of our forces in this assault, and to determine exact timings. The detail plans will be presented 7 days from now. There will then be two weeks to rehearse and prepare. All units will be trained and rehearsed by the 13th August, ready for the advance on the base.
Your mission is to destroy the six 155mm mobile guns and the Armoured Troop Carriers located on the West side of Route 2. You will have available to you all of our 57mm and 75 mm Recoilless Rifles - at least 20 anti tank weapons, with as much ammunition as you can carry. Your protection and ammunition porter groups will be a company from 3 Battalion, 275 Regiment.
Those targets must be destroyed. They will be on the left flank of our attacking force and are the greatest threat to our success. Fire from your group is not expected to hinder the attack force as any overshoots will be over the heads of the assault forces due to the slopes on either side of Route 2. For reconnaissance and marking of your route to your positions, you have the help of the local Hoa Long unit, which knows the ground very well.
You must be in position before the diversion attack starts. You may open fire as soon as your targets move out from behind their sandbag emplacements to support the North Western base defences. The Australians will assume that you are firing in support of the diversion attack anyway, so you don't need to observe the H-Hour attack timings.
Practice weapon teams in night movement and firing, and stress their importance in destroying the targets.
The Regimental and Battalion reconnaissance teams under the command of the Regimental Reconnaissance Company Commander will plan, mark and secure all routes and assembly areas. Each Group Commander here will supply liaison and planning assistance for this essential and critical part for the success of the attack.
All HMG units will be pooled to give supporting fire to the assaulting groups. You will be located on the high ground South of the Southern Australian Infantry Unit. You will also suppress any supporting fire from that Australian unit. Protection and porter parties will be a Company provided from 3 Bn of 275 Regt.
You will be co-located with the HMGs, where you will support the assaults and suppress any Australian resistance. From your position at the South, you will also be able to support the Anti Tank Group to the West.
After the main assault, you will shift your fire to the enemy on Nui Dat hill itself, and be available for on-call targets.
Mortar and HMG groups must be in place before the diversionary attack starts.
Protection and porter parties will again be supplied by a Company from 3Bn, 275 Regt.
There are three other special task groups:
There will be 5 assault groups. The 1st and 2nd assault groups will be from D445 Bn. Being the local Provincial unit they will be best able to move through Long Phuoc village and into the attack area and best able to communicate with the Hoa Long cadre. They must be the ones seen by the villagers to have attacked the Australian base and to be victorious. What the rest of the attack does will be screened from the villagers, so they will believe that this has been a Local Force victory.
Once you have taken the guns, you will secure the flank areas of the gun position and the 2nd assault group will pass through to attack the headquarters.
All casualties will be evacuated first to Route 2, where they will receive first aid. All captured vehicles will also be taken to Route 2, for collection of wounded for evacuation up Route 2 and thence to the Nui May Tao mountains. The D440 Company to co-ordinate.
Vehicles with casualties will move North as soon as Route 2 is cleared.
The local VC units, D445 and D440 Battalions, will move to Hoa Long village as soon as the "disengage" signal is made, or at 4:30am at the latest. The villagers will know what's been happening, and will be prepared to receive the victors. The forces that come to the Australian's aid will not attack the village. Some troops will hide amongst the villages then disperse over the next few weeks. Most will scatter over the first 24 hours, before the Saigon Government has organised an efficient counter-attack.
The Anti Tank group, with their protection and porter party will disperse to the West of Route 2, going to the sanctuary of the Nui Dinh mountains to regroup.
The HMGs and Mortars and their protection and porter parties will disperse East, back the way you came, and head to the Nui May Tao's.
1 Bn, 275 Regt which assaulted the Infantry at the North of the base will exit the Infantry wire heading North and will assemble at Binh Ba to advise them of the victory. It will protect the vehicle convoy along Route 2 until it turns off East.
2 Bn, 275 Regt which assaulted the Infantry at the East of the base will exit the Infantry wire heading North East, back to the Nui May Tao's. Watch out for the Company we drew out to follow up the Mortar Team a couple of days before the assault - they will still be out of the way to the North East of their base. They should represent little trouble as they will be without support from their base, and will be demoralised by the nights events anyway!
The diversionary attack force of one of the 274 Regt Battalions will also move North to rejoin 274 Regt at the ambush site as soon as the main assault starts.
The attack described never took place, so it's not known how close this estimate might be to the one which was planned. However, if the VC Plan was anything like this one, then the likelihood of success would have been more than any Australian would have wished.
It is acknowledged by all sources - including both of the academics - that:
[
Sign my
Guestbook]
- [Read
my Guestbook
]
[Guestbook by TheGuestBook.com]