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"SAS training is arduous and exacting. The Role of the unit demands a particular type of soldier of outstanding personal qualities. These personal qualities and make up count more that technical efficiency in his own arm or service. Technical efficiency can be taught, the personnel qualities required of long range, long term operations in enemy territory however are part of a man's character and although they may be developed over a period, they must be leant in childhood. These qualities are: initiative, self discipline, independence of mind, ability to work without supervision, stamina, patience and a sense of humour. The aim is to find the individualist with a sense of self discipline rather than the man who is a good member of a team. The self disciplined individualist will always fit well into a team when team work is required, but a man selected for team work is by no means always suitable for work outside the team."
In August 1961 it was decided that the primary role of the SAS was to be reconnaissance, both medium and long term. It's secondary role was to be small scale harrasment of the enemy.
On the 20th August , an instruction from Army Headquarters was issued that the SAS Company should be raised to Regiment status and that the previously existing link with the Royal Australian Regiment should be broken and on the 4th September 1964 a Regimental Parade was reviewed by Major-General J.S.Anderson. The newly formed Regiment was to see action in Borneo in February 1965.
Borneo was to see the continuation of the lack of clear understanding of command of the correct use of the SAS skills. It is true that much was gained by the SAS in experience and development of tactics. borneo saw the institution of the British 22 SAS example of four man patrols, the use and deployment of Claymore mines. The fact that in Borneo Australian troops were engaging Indonesian troops in combat, while Indonesian Officers were receiving training by the Australian Army under government instruction did not go unnoticed by Australian soldiers. The SAS in Borneo developed their skills in Surveillance and in the skill of hard hitting action in the enemies backyard, In effect "out guerillaring" the guerilla's.
In 1966 the SAS was first deployed in Vietnam, by then the SAS had been expanded from two squadrons to three. As well as a Base Squadron and H.Q. In late 1966 a Signals (chooks) Squadron was to be raised Although as in all theatres of operation the SAS was never to be deployed as a Regiment. The Regiment structure being there to provide the necessary infrastructure to enable Squadron of SAS to be deployed wherever required.
Phouc Tuy Province 70n kilometres south east of Saigon was to be the area of operation for the next six years. Vietnam was to see the formation of a very close relationship with 9 Squadron R.A.A.F., this closeness was begun when in training with 5 Squadron R.A.A.F. based at Pearce Base in Western Australia and continued on as those members of 5 Squadron were rotated to 9 Squadron in Vietnam. The SAS were to rely heavily on the skills of the Squadron "chopper" pilots.
The SAS were fortunate to have in Brigadier Jackson someone who was to appreciate the SAS value. He was to later write
" in the Vietnam setting good intelligence was very scarce indeed. I was more than a little interested to know the whereabouts, movements and habits of the two main force VC regiments and one of the local battalions in the Province and nearby areas. I the thought the SAS quite invaluable in gaining this sort of intelligence" He of course was tempted to use the ability of the SAS in a more offensive role, but he understood the value of their 'recce' skills. The irony of course is that the offensive skills of the SAS became to used more and more as time passed
Vietnam was to developed the SAS tactics of Helicopter insertion and extraction, including insertion by rappelling and 'hot extraction' the gentle art of hooking onto a rope in two's and three's dangling below the 'chopper' and swinging here like a tea bag as the 'chopper' would rise and with them still hanging head for safer ground to lower them once more to the ground where they would unhook and clamber aboard.
Although the SAS had as it's primary role it's 'recce' work, ambushes and contacts were inevitable. The response of one patrol commander summing up his patrol after a sticky situation displays the laconic humour of an SAS soldier. Under the heading 'condition of the patrol' he wrote 'A little older'. With five man patrols the SAS was always in a tenuous position and a man wounded caused far greater problems to the SAS than to the infantry. For this reason the SAS were and are very security conscious and plan in great detail all plans including contingency plans.
Ambushing the enemy to obtain information from maps and document became a tool that the SAS used to great effect, however the patrols that gained intelligence without a shot being fired, was sometime to be considered the most successful patrol for if the enemy did not know that they had been visited by the SAS then they would have no for warning of any activity in there area, so would not take what for them would have been the necessary precautions against a follow up force. These type of close reconnaissance patrols were often the more dangerous because it would require the patrol to observe for extended periods and often were required to move very close to the enemy camps. The ability of the SAS to remain concealed so close to the enemy that they could litterally touch them and the news that the enemy would receive that small VC forces would suffer swift violent death in their rear areas from and opponent that they almost never saw caused the enemy to fear and give the SAS the name of 'phantoms of the jungle'
The value of the SAS was appreciated by the Australian higher command. Major General Tim Vincent Commander Australian Force Vietnam had this to say.
" Please do not think that we measure overall success by body count kills- separation of main forces from the population is important, perhaps of paramount importance- erosion of the infrastructure is an essential element of success... But what is clear is that infantry on their own in search and destroy operations against a dispersed enemy, kill at about 3 to 1, The fleeting enemy and out rifle are too evenly matched. This was one of the reasons for asking for medium tanks which can accompany the infantry most places with their canister guns. Dispersed or dispersing VC can nearly always elude our foot infantry who have insufficient immediate contact firepower while on the ground mobility of our infantry is no better and usually inferior to that of the VC... On the other hand small infantry parties operating where the enemy has freedom of unobserved movement can reap a comparative harvest. Our SAS now have 81 kills to their credit with one Aust DOW and one Aust WIA. If for every 100 combat infantry slice the allies could kill 80 enemy a year as our SAS do, then there would be no worthwhile enemy alive after a year. We would like to have more SAS type ambush patrols, but we do not have the Iroquois and gun ships to do it.'
This idea that normal infantry could achieve what the SAS were achieving was a sentiment shared by many in the SAS given that in the area of Phouc Tuy the SAS were not involved in long range deep penetration, However The British officers who were visiting attache reported to their superiors that the SAS were being far to modest about their successes.
In may 1966 to October 1966 a report prepared by the Australian Army Operational Research Group stated that.
That the infantry battalions, two until December 1967 then three had been involved with 74% of all Australian contacts with 24% by SAS and 2% by Armour. However when casualty were examined it was found that of the 410 enemy KIA the infantry had accounted for 188 the SAS 173 and the armour for 49. The infantry had suffered 9 KIA and 73 WIA the SAS had 19 WIA and the armour 2 KIA and 22 WIA .
Weapons of the SAS
The hardware carried by each patrol was totally in the discretionary province of the patrol commander and the indiviual patrol member and depending on a great degree on the type of mission being undertaken. Most soldiers preferred the 7.62 SLR on fully automatic for it's stopping power, however other soldiers were happy with the M16 Armalite. A popular version of the M16 was one with an M79 grenade launcher slung underneath. The earliest form being the XM147 or XM148. later saw the arrival of the M203 version. C.S. grenades along with M26 grenades were carried, on some missions a GPMG M60 machine gun was carried. On rare occasions Silenced Stirling sub machine guns of shotguns were also carried.
Communications of the patrol
Communications the life line of a patrol were handles by the AN PRC 64, a set of high frequency that was able to be used in Morse or Voice. Three URC 10 These sets had the beacon and voice facilities. The beacon facility was capable of being picked up by aircraft. Three sets were carried in a patrol. Two were on the frequency of support aircraft and one was set on the international frequency(Mayday). Some times the AN PRC 25 was carried. Signals via the AN PRC 64 using Morse code were sent in OTLP. (One time Letter Pad) This was a book with a different code on each page and as the name would suggest, the code for a transmission was only used once. This gave added security . In particular when map references were given using the POO ( Point Of Origin) map referencing system rather than grid references
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since 4th November 1996